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THINKING ON THE EDGE: HEIDEGGER, DERRIDA, AND 
THE DAOIST GATEWAY (MEN 門 )
Steven Burik
Adjunct Faculty at Singapore Management University
Beware of the abysses and the gorges, but also of the bridges and the barriers.
Jacques Derrida1
It is fair to say that many philosophical interpretations of the Daoist classics have 
proceeded, or continue to proceed, to read into these works the quest for a transcen-
dental, foundational principle, a permanent moment of rest beyond the turmoil of 
ever-changing things. According to this interpretation the Daoist sages are those 
who have for all time found this metaphysical ground of all things — “The Way” (dao 
道) — and who have tried (in vain, though, since language cannot convey this ulti-
mate ground) to find ways of expressing this transcendental ground to their audience.
To quote one instance of how easily such metaphysical interpretations impose 
their framework on Daoism I take D. C. Lau’s translation of the Daodejing. Lau says 
in his introduction: “the entity called the tao existed before the universe came into 
being. . . . It has an essence which is genuine, and this genuineness is vouched for by 
the existence of the universe which it has produced and continues to sustain.”2 Al-
though Lau is quick to add that to say that the dao “produced” the universe is really 
“misleading” and only works “in a figurative sense,”3 he nevertheless denotes dao as 
an “essence” and calls “it” an “entity” — which seems to be making the same mistake 
to which Heidegger drew our attention when he tried to point to the ontological dif-
ference between Being and beings. The metaphysics I understand to be at work in 
such interpretations is what Heidegger and Derrida have called philosophy as onto-
theology. It is defined by the search for a transcendent Being or principle, which 
would at the same time be the transcendental condition of possibility for everything 
in this world. This would entail an “essence” that is otherworldly and yet is under-
stood to influence and guide the ongoing processes of the world. I will argue that 
Heidegger, Derrida, and the classical Daoists are better understood not as such meta-
physical and essentialist thinkers, but as advocates of a profoundly inner-worldly way 
of thinking.
That very same metaphysical idea of “essentiality” is expressed by Isabelle Robi-
net when she says that even though the dao is often understood as a first cause, this 
cause is not to be understood in terms of the normal cause-and-effect relation: “That 
the Dao was ‘cause’ does not imply that the world is its ‘effect,’ because here it 
means nothing more than that the world is its unfolding, its manner of appearance. 
The Dao is ‘cause’ in the sense of motion, not of creation ex nihilo.”4 This might 
sound harmless at first glance, although I find it unclear how something can be both 
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a cause and at the same time be seen as just the mere unfolding of events. On closer 
inspection, Robinet perpetuates the metaphysical interpretation of Daoism by stating 
that there are “two notions of the Dao: one that is indeterminate, and the other which 
is at the same time the source of all things and its production.”5 She speaks of the 
essence of “the” Dao and suggests that this essence is something beyond the visible 
world, thereby creating a metaphysical principle. Arguably, her interpretation comes 
from looking at many different interpretations, so she is not just presenting her own 
view. Yet this is precisely the interpretation I wish to argue against: just because dao 
has more often than not been interpreted as a metaphysical source does not mean 
that this interpretation is the only possible or necessary one. Many scholars have 
made the same “onto-theological substance mistake” in seeing a being simultane-
ously just as an entity and also as the highest transcendental being. Thus, dao is 
considered the ineffable, unknowable reality that itself is non-being but nevertheless 
the transcendental source of all beings.6 Examples abound of this kind of reasoning, 
and I shall not dwell on them further, aside from mentioning that this kind of reason-
ing can be found in both Western and Chinese interpreters.7
Against this dominant interpretation of Daoism, a different reading is possible. 
In arguing for such a different approach, I will focus on the situational character of 
Daoism, and show how taking a non-metaphysical approach will help make clear 
that Daoism is concerned with the interrelatedness of all things, and thus also of 
humans with these things. In doing so I will focus specifically on the “gateway” (men 
門) character and draw comparisons with Heidegger and Derrida. I argue that when 
considered closely, the use of this “gateway” character, especially in the Daodejing 
but also in the Zhuangzi, does not point to a transcendent dao beyond the “gate-
way” but to an inner-worldly dao understood as defining regularity within a process 
world.
The Daoist Gateway
In my understanding of Daoism humans are very much a part of the whole process 
of dao, and this means that the different, opposing, or conflicting sides of this proces-
sual world are all equally important. If this is so, humankind should not focus on just 
one side of the process as is usually done in the traditional metaphysical approach. 
Thus, we are neither pure Being nor pure Non-being, neither this nor that, neither 
purely natural nor purely conventional. In Daoist terminology, this is understood as 
being the male but preserving the female. Or the other way around. Put another way, 
human beings are always a bit of both of these yin-yang opposites. Being neither this 
nor that, I will argue, humans would do well to acknowledge that dao is always and 
only like the in-between that itself is not anything, or, in other words, that dao is 
nothing other than the interplay of things and processes. Humans stand in awe of and 
in deference to this process and naturally seek some harmony or way of dealing with 
the processual character of the world. Some kind of balance between opposing 
forces is sought after, yet the Daoist is well aware of the shifting state of this balance, 
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since this balance itself is equally prone to the fate that always tends to upset it in 
temporary favor of one or the other of the extremes.
Taking into account all these considerations about different forces, opposites, 
and balances, it is evident that a closer investigation is called for of the gateway char-
acter (men 門), as a character that defines movement from one side to the other, un-
derstood as in-between. I feel that the in-between-opposites characteristic that is a 
focus of much of Daoism would become clearer through such a closer reading. Is it 
a coincidence that the legendary Laozi was stopped by the “gatekeeper”8 and that 
this gatekeeper persuaded him to write down his teachings before he definitely 
moved to the other side? And that the gatekeeper said to him: “As you are about to 
leave the world behind, could you write a book for my sake?”9 I interpret this story 
metaphorically as telling us something about what the Daoist texts can mean to us, 
in that the Daoist gatekeeper wanted to know how to stay at his post, the gate, in this 
world, from where he could respond to the diverse challenges that would inevitably 
come to him, yet without turning this into a fixed dogmatic position.
Much of the Daodejing is concerned with the opposites of yin 陰 and yang 陽, 
but the point is not so much to favor one of the opposites over the other. Western 
interpreters have often understood the Daodejing in this hierarchical manner, and 
have mostly argued that the Daoists favor the other side of the dichotomy more than 
or over the side that the West has traditionally favored, perhaps since these inter-
preters were searching for an alternative but could not break themselves loose from 
thinking in terms of hierarchies. Although some of the language might suggest this 
hierarchy, as there is much more focus on the yin character traits that one should 
develop, in the end it is the equilibrium or tranquillity (jing 靜) that is sought after, the 
ability to be skillful in staying at the threshold. As chapter 42 of the Daodejing says: 
“Everything carries yin on its shoulders and yang in its arms [a]nd blends these vital 
energies (qi) together to make them harmonious (he).”10 The harmony of this place 
for which I want to take the “gateway” as a metaphor should not, however, be under-
stood as a permanently fixed place; it shifts according to the situation and brings out 
a harmony that is itself a blending of differences, “so that they come together with 
mutual benefit and enhancement without losing their separate and particular identi-
ties.”11 This form of harmony thus does not seek to deny or resolve the differences, 
but to bring them out.
According to Ames and Hall, “[t]he swinging gateway . . . is where and when 
dao spontaneously ‘opens out’ to provide creativity a space through which to make 
its ‘entrance,’ qualifying the processive nature of dao with the immediacy and speci-
ficity of the creative act.”12 To be constantly experiencing afresh means to be con-
stantly alert to dogmatic fixations that would close off avenues to the future, and thus 
it means to stay at the threshold of possibility. The creativity Ames and Hall mention 
would be an openness and responsiveness to whatever would come to be experi-
enced, the inclination to maximize the possibilities of what is offered without impos-
ing on what offers itself. In keeping with the non-metaphysical approach I am taking, 
the gateway is thus not to be understood as a threshold between this world and an-
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other one of transcendent quality, nor to be seen as some escapist hiding place in 
pure tranquillity, detached from the world.
This essay will largely explain how a coherent reading of the gateway character 
leads to an understanding of dao that does not see “it” as a transcendental ground. 
Taking my cue from the Yuandao, where the yuan 原 (source) is more like a yuan 源 
(spring) — a fluid and earthly source — than a fixed principle, I understand the gate-
way as that shifting place of productivity between reversing opposites. That this place 
is itself equally prone to changes and shifts in perspective can be read from the fol-
lowing passage from the Yuandao:
In the innumerable different directions there are countless changes,
Untrammeled I am in no fixed position.
I alone am in great spirits, and leaving things behind,
Travel along the same path as dao.13
Not to be in a fixed position is to follow along with the myriad processes as they 
unfold, neither escaping or keeping away from the specific instances, nor attaching 
to them. The Daoist sage, in another metaphor, keeps to the root and acknowledges 
his/her place: “The myriad things have their progenitor, yet he alone knows to abide 
by the root; The events of the world have a source out of which they come, yet he 
alone knows to abide by the gateway.”14
Another factor that argues in favor of my reading of the importance of the gate-
way character has to do with the relation between presence and non-presence. As I 
see it, presence comes about through non-presence and vice versa. That moment 
between existing and not yet existing can also be conceived as going through a gate-
way, and if we understand this moment in a non-metaphysical way, that gateway is 
indeed the final thing we can say about the whole process:
The convergence of the myriad things
Goes through a single aperture;
The roots of the various happenings
All issue forth from a single gateway.15
Things come into existence from the gateway. The interesting thing I find most in 
favor of a non-metaphysical interpretation is that there never seems to be any signifi-
cant mention of something beyond this gateway; it is the gateway itself that is the fi-
nal port of call. We can also read this in the first chapter of the Daodejing. The 
standard or metaphysical interpretation of Daoism would have it that the gateway 
would be that place between the “real” dao and the artificial language used to de-
scribe it. Yet my different reading is that both language and dao are constitutive of 
that gateway in a different way. The gateway is the meeting place of humankind and 
dao precisely through language. This, at least, is how I would interpret the last lines 
of chapter 1 of the Daodejing: “These two — the nameless and what is named — emerge 
from the same source yet are referred to differently. Together they are called obscure. 
The obscurest of the obscure, [t]hey are the swinging gateway of the manifold mys-
teries.”16 The nameless and the named, although the most obscure, are the inner-
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worldly gateway. Notice that these lines do not say that they come from somewhere 
else through the gateway, but that they are the gateway.
Yet there is a slight problem in putting so much emphasis on this gateway char-
acter. First of all, it is obviously just one of many metaphors used in describing dao 
and/or the Daoist sage. Nevertheless I think it is an important one, especially when 
we read it differently. The problem arises when we have to explain the lines in c hapter 
52 of the Daodejing, which are repeated in chapter 56: “Block up the openings,
[a]nd shut the gateways, [a]nd to the end of your days your energies will not be used 
up.”17 These lines seem to offer a somewhat negative understanding of the gateway. 
Yet we can explain this in the following way: to shut the gateway is to make sure one 
is not disturbed or influenced by external factors and arbitrary fixations. As Ames and 
Hall explain, it is to “conserve one’s vital energies and to avoid depletion that is 
caused by externally induced agitation.”18 This can be understood as a return to dao 
when we think of dao as an undifferentiated state of being. This return does not mean 
a retreat to “the inner circle” but on the contrary an opening up to the world without 
artificial inhibitions. I think what is meant here is an awareness of the possible con-
sequences of attaching to various external values and things. It is a way to “keep your 
mirror bright” — to use an often employed Daoist expression — unblemished by non-
essential factors. Blocking the openings and shutting the gateway can then be under-
stood as gathering and keeping the focus, not being distracted by artificial distinctions, 
or, in Zhuangzi’s words:
To “divide,” then, is to leave something undivided; to “discriminate between alternatives” 
is to leave something which is neither alternative. “What?” you ask. The sage keeps it in 
his breast, common men argue over alternatives to show it to each other. Hence I say: “To 
‘discriminate between alternatives’ is to fail to see something.”19
Standing in the gateway as I have tried to explain it is also exactly this awareness and 
the ability to respond to what comes your way in ever differing appropriateness, 
mirror-like. In this reading, then, there is no real clash between these different uses 
of the gateway character.
Now, for the Daoist sage, the way to get to this ever-shifting place is by “asking” 
(wen 問) and “hearing” (wen 聞), the characters for which stress the importance of 
language, and I now want to focus on these characters and especially on the “space 
between” (jian 間) character as characters that are paronomastically20 close to the 
gateway character. To start with the Daodejing, chapter 5 talks about the “space be-
tween” heaven and earth as man’s abode. The “space between” character is closely 
related to the gateway character and can therefore be seen as that shifting place that 
is itself nothing, but from which all diversity issues. This is especially so if we stop 
reading tian 天 as “Heaven,” and instead read it as the whole process of the world, 
or “nature.” Chapter 10 has the lines “With nature’s [tian] gates swinging open and 
closed, Are you able to remain the female?”21 This is usually understood as suggest-
ing that one should keep to the yin side of the dichotomy, yet it can also be under-
stood as suggesting that one should not venture beyond tian as the realm of heaven 
and earth toward some otherworldly entity or principle. Rather one should remain 
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firmly rooted in this world. Something similar can be read in chapter 73: “Tian’s net 
is cast wide, [a]nd although coarse in its mesh, nothing slips through it.”22 Tian as 
nature, in the widest sense of the word, and the mother and the female can then, in 
similar fashion as the yuan source, be read as metaphors for the this-worldly ap-
proach that I have been arguing for as characteristic of Daoism.
The character for “hearing” (wen 聞) is normally used in the Daodejing just for 
the faculty of hearing, yet in some instances it is better understood as “learning” or 
“knowing,” specifically when used against the “knowing” (zhi 知) that is common 
knowledge. This seems to be the case in chapters 41 and 48, where learning (about) 
dao is specifically connected to hearing. Another character related to the gateway is 
“asking” (wen 問). Although not prominent in the Daodejing, it does appear in the 
appendix, which Ames and Hall added in their translation, that formed a part of the 
1993 Guodian archaeological findings. All these characters — hearing, space be-
tween, asking — are then paronomastically related to the gateway, which means that 
we can further our understanding of the Daoist position by seeing it as something in 
which openness and the willingness to hear, learn, and ask ever anew are important 
features.
A point often made by those defending metaphysical readings of Daoism is that 
chapter 25 of the Daodejing speaks about dao as if it were prior to the world. Yet we 
can understand this differently, in the sense that dao itself is not the metaphysical 
entity that seems to be suggested here, because it is not the endpoint, since dao itself 
is modeled on what is ziran 自然, “so of itself.” I think, therefore, that this chapter 
speaks about dao before human beings introduced the distinction between heaven 
and earth and placed themselves in the middle. So dao is not earlier than what is 
natural or self-so of the world; it is only earlier than these artificial distinctions. In my 
opinion this is also why some metaphysical language seems to get used “under era-
sure” in Daoism. I am thinking of the frequent occurrence of constructions in which, 
in translation,23 the verb “seeming” plays an important role. In chapter 4 of the
Daodejing it is said of dao that “it” “seems” (si 似) the predecessor of wanwu, and 
that “it” “seems” only to persist. Chapter 6, speaking of the gateway and root char-
acter of dao, also says “it” just “seems” (ruo 若) to be there. And as chapter 14 tells 
us, the reason for this seeming is that dao as the whole process is beyond determina-
tion, and, being indeterminate, “it” cannot be determined by anything determinate. 
Things are not what they seem to be, and this is especially so for dao or tian and 
similar concepts, which can too easily be misunderstood as standing for determinate 
entities or principles. But what Daoists tell us is that since language only works 
through such determinations, we must use it carefully and not lose sight of its meta-
phorical nature.24 Seen in this way, the particular metaphysical distinction between 
reality and appearance that tells us that there is a “true” reality hiding behind the 
appearances of the world seems not to feature in any prominent way in Daoism.
Turning to the Zhuangzi, there the “gateway” (men 門) character mostly occurs 
in its ordinary use of door, or gateway, although there are a number of instances 
where the more philosophical use I am focusing on can be found. Tianmen, the gate 
of heaven, is mentioned in chapters 14 and 23. In chapter 14 it is said: “Only he who 
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complies with the Great Change and allows no blockage” is able to follow dao. “If 
the mind cannot accept this fact, then the doors (men) of Heaven will never open.”25 
Following dao here does not mean seeing the world as static, but rather following the 
process of change. In chapter 23 we can read that dao has “no source, . . . no place 
where it resides, . . . no beginning or end,”26 and as such it is called “the Heavenly 
(tian) Gate.”27 Reminding ourselves that “nature understood as the whole process of 
the world” is to be preferred to “Heaven” as translation of tian, the message here is 
similar to that of the Daodejing: the artificiality of making fixed distinctions between 
this and that, right and wrong, is attacked, and in its place comes an understanding 
of the world that focuses on acknowledging the open-ended process nature of dao. 
To have this understanding is to reach the “gate of tian.” The sages should therefore 
seek positions which allow them to see both “this” and “that.” Such positions or 
states are “called the hinge of the Way. When the hinge is fitted into the socket, it can 
respond endlessly.”28 So Zhuangzi is also speaking of the gateway, or at least of the 
hinge, itself not anything, but still imperative as a responsiveness to the process of 
change. In chapter 33 it is even said that the sage will “make Heaven his source, 
Virtue his root, and the Way his gate (men), revealing himself through change and 
transformation.”29
With the undecidability between “this” and “that,” Zhuangzi argues for a similar 
“in-between” stance that sees the processes of the world as ever changing. Thus, 
things are never strict identities; they are always in motion and thus always becoming 
something other than what they are at that point in time. In that sense the processes 
form an ever-shifting gateway between the opposite forces of yin and yang. This is 
what is meant by seeing things not as “being,” but more as “becoming.” Since this is 
ziran, the sage should thus identify with this becoming or transformation, so as to 
overcome the narrow perspective of identity as unchanging. Things as processes
have no strict boundaries; there is always a necessary vagueness or penumbra that 
Zhuangzi explores extensively and which precludes the permanence of our artificial 
naming of things, and thus precludes our seeing them as fixed entities.30 In Z huangzi’s 
terms, the processes of the world are always somewhere between the potter’s wheel 
and the grindstone of nature, between emerging and vanishing. The sage’s job is to 
see both this emerging and this vanishing as equally necessary. A similar idea is ex-
pressed in the Yuandao chapter of the Huainanzi:
Thus, where the attention of the spirit is directed toward the small, it is oblivious to the 
big; Where it is directed toward the internal, it is oblivious to what’s going on externally; 
Where it is directed toward what is above, it is oblivious to what is below; Where it is 
directed toward the left, it is oblivious to the right. It is only when there is no place that 
the spirit does not fill that there is nowhere toward which the focus is not directed.31
The trick is thus not to escape the realm of the human into something other, it is not 
to go to the other side of the so-called gate and try to stay in the “heavens,” but 
rather to have that “knack” to respond to differing situations that demand both inter-
nal and external attention.
Another way of understanding this is by looking at chapter 6 of the Zhuangzi, 
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where one of the provisional names for dao is “Peace-in-Strife.”32 The tranquillity we 
are looking for is to be found inside the world of strife, not somewhere outside. The 
idea of this is to be able to follow the ever-changing equilibrium between yin and 
yang forces, something that can also be read in chapter 11, where the “dark and 
mysterious gate”33 is exactly the passage from yang to yin (and of course this passage 
is reversible). This idea of responsiveness, which the sage embodies, is being some-
times a companion of tian, sometimes a companion of a human being, but more 
likely a bit of both, according to the shifting circumstances. This is why Zhuangzi 
advocates following the “torch of chaos and doubt.”34 And it is also why Zhuangzi 
has Kuan-yin, the keeper of the gate, saying:
Within yourself, no fixed positions:
Things as they take shape disclose themselves.
Moving, be like water,
Still, be like a mirror,
Respond like an echo.35
If we take this idea seriously, then, in my opinion, the point of the first chapter of 
the Zhuangzi is to show that there is difference in understanding, that conventional 
understanding will not get beyond itself, and that there is a need to overcome this 
restricted way of thinking. The bird Peng and the fish Kun have many more capabili-
ties than their counterparts, the smaller animals. Yet Peng and Kun, too, are in some 
way restricted, as is Liezi’s flying exercise. And their hugeness effectively prevents 
them from being able to do what the small animals do. Therefore, I think the first 
chapter of the Zhuangzi is meant to show a preference for the overall view, or for
the bigger picture, but this bigger picture is not something beyond all different per-
spectives, but rather a wider or broader view that acknowledges the importance of 
different views. This equally entails an awareness of the situatedness of all thinking, 
something that the Autumn Floods chapter and numerous other instances suggest:
A beam or a pillar can be used to batter down a city wall, but it is no good for stopping 
up a little hole — this refers to a difference in function. Thoroughbreds like Qiji and H ualiu 
could gallop a thousand li in one day, but when it came to catching rats they were no 
match for the wildcat or the weasel — this refers to a difference in skill. The horned owl 
catches fleas at night and can spot the tip of a hair, but when daylight comes, no matter 
how wide it opens its eyes, it cannot see a mound or a hill — this refers to a difference in 
nature. Now do you say that you are going to make Right your master and do away with 
Wrong, or make Order your master and do away with Disorder? If you do, then you have 
not understood the principle of heaven and earth or the nature of the ten thousand things. 
This is like saying that you are going to make Heaven your master and do away with Earth, 
or make Yin your master and do away with Yang. Obviously it is impossible.36
Although the preference thus seems to be one side of the perceived dichotomy 
or opposition, it is really both sides that are needed and the equilibrium and har-
mony between the different functions, skills, and natures that is sought. One side is 
merely privileged since the other side needs to be reigned in. In any case, no meta-
physical principle is invoked or needed for an explanation. Again, by arguing for the 
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importance of an inner-worldly understanding of this gateway character, I have in 
fact been arguing that non-metaphysical readings of Daoism are coherent and sup-
ported by textual evidence.
Heidegger and Derrida on “In-between”
For a corroboration of my non-metaphysical approach I now turn to Heidegger and 
Derrida. Many comparisons of Daoism and Heidegger and/or Derrida have been of-
fered, but I wish to stay with the “in-between” character and focus the comparison 
there.
Heidegger and Derrida espouse a way of thinking that leaves behind the narrow 
confines of metaphysical thought, without thereby denying metaphysics its place. In 
fact, neither Heidegger nor Derrida sees himself as completely free from m etaphysics. 
Rather, their works revolve around metaphysics and are located on its margins, its 
boundaries. Yet as deconstructive they aim at the heart of metaphysics, not to over-
come the metaphysical tradition, but to get to its fundamental presuppositions and 
show how these constitute only one part of what is called thinking. Similarly, to con-
ceive of culturally different and thus often substantially different ways of thinking as 
situated both inside and outside philosophy is especially suited to the whole program 
of comparative philosophy, as it is not a matter of thinking in a dualistic inside or 
outside, philosophy or thinking, but a non-dualist thinking that tries to overcome 
these sorts of distinctions and hierarchies, or, in other words, tries to think in-between 
different cultures. That in-between I locate in Heidegger as the Auseinandersetzung 
and the Lichtung and Ereignis; in Derrida as the trace, différance, spacing, and play; 
and in Daoism as dao, the hinge, the interplay of yin and yang — and, of course, as 
the gateway (men 門).
Auseinandersetzung or “con-frontation” is an important concept in Heidegger’s 
work, and although it is itself nothing since only a function of the different confront-
ing sides, it is still what takes place in-between differences. This in-between is a 
constant focus of Heidegger’s work, as evident from the following passage from Un-
terwegs zur Sprache:
The intimacy of world and thing is present in the separation of the between; it is present 
in the dif-ference. The word dif-ference is now removed from its usual and customary 
usage. What it now names is not a generic concept for various kinds of differences. It ex-
ists only as this single difference. It is unique. Of itself, it holds apart the middle in and 
through which world and things are at one with each other. The intimacy of the dif- 
ference is the unifying element of the diaphora, the carrying out that carries through. The 
dif-ference carries out world in its worlding, carries out things in their thinging. Thus car-
rying them out, it carries them toward one another. The dif-ference does not mediate after 
the fact by connecting world and things through a middle added on to them. Being the 
middle, it first determines world and things in their presence, i.e., in their being toward 
one another, whose unity it carries out.37
It is difference that is most important, and from this difference we start looking for 
what is common, or wherein this middle lies. Yet the opposites are always already 
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connected in an essential way. Importantly, the “intimacy” or unity of the differences 
does not exist anywhere else but in the interplay of the differences.
Heidegger also understands Ereignis fundamentally as in-between: “Yet this ‘in-
between’ is not a ‘transcendence’ in relation to man, but on the contrary it is that 
openness to which man as founder and keeper belongs, since as Dasein he is en-
owned (er-eignet) by Being itself, which is none other than Ereignis.”38 In other words, 
Being is none other than what happens in Ereignis, and this is definitely not to be 
understood as transcendence, but as “opening in-between.” In a similar vein Hei-
degger also says: “Ereignis is the self-ascertaining (ermittelnde) and self-effecting 
(vermittelnde) middle (Mitte), in which all presencing (Wesung) of the truth of Being 
has to be thought back beforehand.”39 This “middle” as the in-between is not a 
 dialectic third, but the endurance of difference, since “truth happens as clearing 
concealing.”40
Heidegger’s famous reinterpretation of Heraclitus’ fragment about war being the 
father of all things concludes that con-frontation, as Auseinandersetzung, is the be-
getter and keeper of all things. Difference and the interaction of differences thus be-
come extremely important. In this context Heidegger even explicitly names polemos 
as “die Lichtung”41 (the clearing). Again, Lichtung is originally the empty space or 
clearing in a forest. The point being of course that Lichtung is only such in the sur-
rounding darkness of the forest. Again, the reading is non-metaphysical since it does 
not posit a source of light beyond this world, but reads the in-between as inner-
worldly. In other, very Heideggerian words, “Clearing (Lichtung) is never the empty, 
but the most originary thorough swaying (Wesen) of en-owning (Ereignis) as the 
 settlement of the countering and strife — the ‘in-between’ held unto the ab-ground 
(Abgrund).”42
In this context we can also think of the ontological difference of Being and b eings 
in Heidegger. Heidegger went to great lengths to avoid this difference being under-
stood as a metaphysical idea, where Being would somehow stand over and against 
beings. I have tried to present through the gateway character a similar idea in Daoism 
that acknowledges the importance of the in-between, while not succumbing to a 
metaphysical reading that would see it as an overarching third position outside the 
play of differences. As the process of differing, dao is this play of differences through 
this in-between.
I now wish to turn to Derrida, who is known for the idea that speech is also and 
equally a sign structure like writing and thus suffers from the same artificiality as writ-
ing. In other words, Derrida denies the priority normally given to the spoken word. 
But by doing this Derrida is not arguing for the inversion of importance or priority, 
which would mean that writing should come to be seen as prior to speech. This inver-
sion is just strategic and provocative; it is not the goal itself, which is to show the 
interconnectedness or relationality of both writing and speech, and their sameness as 
artificial structures, and as such to undo or transform the oppositional structure itself. 
This is also why différance is “between speech and writing,”43 and it is thus exactly 
this in-between that is the focus of Derrida. Because it is not simply so that signs can 
function only because of other signs, they also function because of the interval, spac-
ing, or nothingness that is between them, and this is so in both speech and in writing.
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Related to this is the idea of the blank, the empty space between words, the spac-
ing, whether in speech or writing, that Derrida takes to function as the condition of 
possibility for words to function as relative identities. Derrida says of the empty 
space, the blank: “since it has no meaning, it is not The blank proper, the transcen-
dental origin of the series.”44 Again there is a reading that tries to undo any meta-
physical notions of transcendentality, or of first principles, in favor of an idea of the 
play of the word itself.
Différance, then, as this interplay of what we like to describe as space and time, 
is located “between speech and writing, and beyond the tranquil familiarity which 
links us to one and the other, occasionally reassuring us in our illusion that they are 
two.”45 Similarly, “Différance is the systematic play of differences, of the traces of 
differences, of the spacing by means of which elements are related to each other.”46 
As such, the blank, spacing, and the in-between themselves are nothing, but they do 
make possible any signification and any difference, without recourse to metaphysical 
principles. This can be read in resonance with Daodejing chapter 11, where it is sug-
gested that emptiness is exactly what provides the possibility of signification. Tradi-
tional interpretations take this emptiness to function as a metaphysical guiding 
principle underlying all the things in the world, but we can see now that emptiness 
can also coherently be understood as a function of the particular things that at any 
time make up the process, yet without “itself” being anything outside the process.
The Relevance of Language
It is interesting in this context to look briefly at ideas about language in Daoism. I will 
argue that the same attitude that is found in my interpretation of the gateway can also 
be seen in the approach to language that defines so much of Daoism. It is often ar-
gued by those who seek a metaphysical understanding of Daoism that dao can not 
be named. It is indeed something ineffable, but I would say that this is not because, 
as so many (Western and Chinese) interpreters have assumed, dao is a transcendental 
principle above the rest of the world, but because the complete process of transfor-
mation is, as its nature implies, not something we can pin down or relate to anything 
else behind the process. As Ames puts it:
With no assumed “One-behind-the-many” as the ultimate source of meaning, there is no 
single-ordered world, no “uni-verse,” only the ongoing evolving harmony expressed as 
the quality of life achieved by the insistent, co-creating particulars.47
Daoist thinking implies an understanding that this relationality is ever changing, an 
ever ongoing process of transformation, and this implies that any “rectification of 
names” or use of language is therefore provisional and in need of constant renewal. 
Not only is dao beyond naming, but all naming is only a provisional, temporary fix-
ing in place [=stabilizing of ] what is essentially always in flux.
As a whole, language is seen as prescriptive according to conventional s tandards, 
but the Daoist recognizes that these standards are not permanent; hence, the discus-
sion about which dao to follow is indeed the discussion about how to see language. 
As Hansen puts it:
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The distinctive claim of the Taoist is that . . . our conventional ways of doing things with 
prescriptive language are always changing — there is no constant, absolute, guide to 
behavior in all circumstances. . . . And, as the Lao-tzu points out, the reason no such 
discourse is constant is that language (names) is inconstant — artificial, conventional, 
changeable. No Tao is constant because no name is constant.48
Daoists understood the relativity of a guide that has no permanent standard to refer 
to. Hansen’s reinterpretation of the first lines of the first chapter of the Daodejing 
shows us that “names,” or rather language, does not point to anything metaphysical 
and unchanging. It is a conventional tool that is dependent on situation. As such I 
read the Daoist approach to language as corroborative of my gateway approach.
It is also often argued that Daoists in general and Zhuangzi in particular pro-
pose to do away with language because of this impermanence, but, again, I think 
this is a misunderstanding. Let us look at one of the passages often invoked in this 
argument:
The fish trap exists because of the fish; once you’ve gotten the fish, you can forget about 
the trap. The rabbit snare exists because of the rabbit; once you’ve gotten the rabbit, you 
can forget the snare. Words exist because of meaning; once you’ve gotten the meaning, 
you can forget the words. Where can I find a man who has forgotten words so I can have 
a word with him?49
It is important to understand this passage not as saying that we can do without lan-
guage once we have the meaning of life, but as saying that we must always return to 
language, even when we think we no longer need it. Otherwise Zhuangzi could have 
stopped at “where can I find a man who has forgotten words,” but he deliberately 
added “so I can have a word with him.” You can only forget the fish trap for a short 
moment, while you have fish. Once the fish run out, become exhausted, you need 
the fish trap again, and you might have to do some repairs as well. On the level of 
language I take this to mean that the metaphysical idea that there is some ultimate 
and unchanging reality conveyed by words but is essentially in a different realm is 
undone by pointing to the provisionality of words, not with respect to this ultimate 
truth, but with respect to the description of the world. You need first to forget about 
words as having a fixed reference, but not to leave them behind permanently. After 
forgetting them, the realization that you will still need them sets in, and then you 
need to reinvent or reintroduce, or reinscribe them.
Dealing with this fluidity of language is like the goblet of the “goblet words,” 
which is another translation of the “spillover saying”50 that Graham mentions, in that 
the goblet does not get rid of itself, but of what it has too much of, as it rights itself 
again after emptying itself. Zhuangzi does not suggest overcoming language in some 
mystical state; he argues for the equality and provisionality of all language and thus 
of all views, which means that any mystical state is not better or worse than another 
state, but also suffers from the same provisionality. As the second chapter of the 
Zhuangzi shows, there is not one language that can proclaim to be representative of 
the “piping of heaven,” nor can any man claim to have a special access to this “pip-
ing of heaven.” In a typical move, Zhuangzi first seems to assent to the idea that the 
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“piping of heaven” is more valuable or more real than the “piping of man,” but he 
then goes on to show that there really is no way of distinguishing between these two, 
which on the level of language means that all language is permissible and not per-
missible in the same way, since all language is equally artificial.
A similar idea is also found in the Daodejing, where it is not argued that we 
should stop using language, but that we should know where its limits are. Chapter 
78, for example, does not say that all language is bad per se, but that “appropriate 
language seems contradictory.”51 This means that appropriate language is not to be 
understood in the same category as normal language. Appropriate language is lan-
guage aware of its own provisionality.
Language can still be seen as the intermediary between man and the world, and 
it is definitely what makes us special. Yet as in-between it must be recognized as 
provisional, shifting, and ultimately part of the same process. It is in this sense that 
the interpretation I have given of the gateway, together with Derrida’s criticism of the 
metaphysical ideas of language, is relevant to and corroborated by the Daoist ap-
proach to language. When language is understood to be provisional and metaphor-
ical in its essence, the gateway can be understood as one of the most important 
metaphors, indicating that shifting place between nameless and named.
Back to the Comparison
Returning now to Derrida, one other aspect of his thinking that is conducive to 
 under standing Daoism and the gateway as I do is found in Derrida’s ideas about 
space and time, temporization. He says regarding time — and I will have to quote at 
length:
It is because of différance that the movement of signification is possible only if each so-
called “present” element, each element appearing on the scene of presence, is related to 
something other than itself, thereby keeping within itself the mark of the past element, 
and already letting itself be vitiated by the mark of its relation to the future element, this 
trace being related no less to what is called the future than to what is called the past, and 
constituting what is called the present by means of this very relation to what it is not: what 
it is absolutely not, not even a past or a future as a modified present. An interval must 
separate the present from what it is not in order for the present to be itself, but this interval 
that constitutes it as present must, by the same token, divide the present in and of itself, 
thereby also dividing, along with the present, everything that is thought on the basis of the 
present, that is, in our metaphysical language, every being, and singularly substance or 
the subject. In constituting itself, in dividing itself dynamically, this interval is what might 
be called spacing, the becoming-space of time or the becoming-time of space (tempori-
zation).52
In my view, this interval, the between that is itself nothing, not just as difference, but 
also as time-related difference, as spacing, or as trace, is an important aspect of Dao-
ist thinking if we understand it more as process thinking than as metaphysics. Both 
Derrida and Daoism seem to insist that we are never really talking about enduring 
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identities, but always about shifting processes and that the only true response to this 
processual reality is to be in-between it all, to acknowledge rather than fight the pro-
cess of dao. Or, in the words of Ames and Hall:
Within the rhythms of life, the swinging gateway opens and novelty emerges spontane-
ously to revitalize the world, tempering whatever has moved to an extreme, and reclaim-
ing whatever has strayed from the path. Whatever is most enduring is ultimately overtaken 
in the ceaseless transformation of things.53
What is most important, then, is not to seek to undo difference in favor of unity, but 
to seek to understand that difference is at the very least equally important. Identities 
are provisional functions of differences, and the traditional subject-object hierarchy 
is denied.
In this context, what is “other,” then, is not something we can fully master, or that 
we can summon with our language, but it is something that has to come of its own, 
“[y]et it is necessary to prepare for it; for to allow the coming of the entirely other, 
passivity, a certain kind of resigned passivity for which everything comes down to the 
same, is not suitable. Letting the other come is not inertia opening to anything what-
ever.”54 This passage of Derrida reminds us immediately of Heidegger’s Gelassen-
heit. Gelassenheit also is not anything like a passive attitude; it is an active opening 
up of your own thought structures, which is necessary for other ways of thinking to 
find an entrance. Derrida is arguing for a similar attitude, a responsive and thereby 
responsible opening. But the difference with Heidegger could be that it is actually 
deconstruction(s) that provide(s) the possible opening “by bending [the] rules with 
respect for the rules themselves in order to allow the other to come or to announce 
its coming in the opening of this dehiscence. That is perhaps what we call decon-
struction.”55
This notion of “dehiscence” also features in Limited Inc, where it is similarly used 
as the opening toward what is other. The Oxford English dictionary lists “dehiscence” 
as: “gaping, opening by divergence of parts,”56 and states that the term is mostly used 
in botany. It signals the opening toward what is other in the opening of the flower or 
seed, and this opening up what is closed is therefore constitutive of life. Thus, the 
space created by opening up our thought structures, by deconstructing what is sup-
posedly an identity, is what makes any intercultural encounter between the self and 
the other possible. I would argue that in Daoism, through the attitude exemplified by 
the gateway, a similar thing happens, in that the Daoist is aware of the artificial na-
ture of naming things permanently. In other words, the Daoist understands the es-
sentially provisional and metaphorical nature of language, and with this awareness 
the Daoist tries to make a stand in the opening toward what is other, never fully con-
trollable and thus never fully fixed.
The status of the other is therefore not something that can be subsumed in Hege-
lian fashion under the category of the same. The point Derrida seems to be making is 
that any encounter with what is other can never be appropriated beforehand; it is an 
encounter with multiple voices and is thus structurally open-ended. Yet it is always 
there. Of interest for comparative philosophy is what Geoffrey Bennington well 
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summed up by saying that in Derrida’s work “[t]he point . . . is not to reintegrate re-
mains into philosophy, but . . . to introduce a radical nondialectizable alterity into 
the heart of the same.”57 And therefore to remain, with the tension that this implies, 
in the Auseinandersetzung that deconstruction is.
A couple of other concepts in Derrida point to a similar focus. Apart from frayage 
(breaching), Derrida also mentions the French brisure, which means both “joint” and 
“break,” and thus is both what brings things together and what sets them apart. Bri-
sure can thus mean what is split, fractured, broken and also a hinge, a joint, as in
the hinge that connects two parts.58 All these words — différance, hinge, brisure, 
spacing — point to the same thing: that interminable process of the play of d ifferences. 
And this is also what Daoism points to. As Zhuangzi puts it: “[A]ll the ten thousand 
things are what they are, and thus they enfold each other.”59 This is also the way I 
read the Cook Ding passage of chapter 3 of the Zhuangzi. Cook Ding says that his 
skill is really about finding the spaces in-between where things are joined: “At that 
joint there is an interval, and the chopper’s edge has no thickness; if you insert what 
has no thickness where there is an interval, then . . . there is ample room to move the 
edge about.”60 The joint and the interval are the same, that in-between space that 
divides and connects.
Conclusion
It is precisely this gateway, this hinge, that I have taken as an important lead in this 
article. I have argued that humanity in general, and more importantly the Daoist 
sages, should be somewhere in-between tian and everyday humanity. A person in 
“whom neither Heaven nor man is victor over the other, this is what is meant by the 
True Man.”61 But we must take caution not to understand tian as an otherworldly 
place. I have also argued that the works of the Daoist classics are aimed at preparing 
people for a responsiveness to the world around them that recognizes both the 
dangers and the importance of language as necessities. Language is the in-between 
between man and the world, yet the Daoist understands the provisionality and meta-
phoricity of this tool without undermining its importance.
In all these senses there is an important place for the non-place of the in-between 
or interval, the gateway. The recognition of this importance is what makes Daoism 
focus on the inner-worldly play of the processes that make up the world, and ulti-
mately these processes include ourselves. If this is so, then the strength of Daoism 
lies not in making humankind special by placing it outside the process, but by locat-
ing it inside the process without reducing humankind’s particular way of being.
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